WITTGENSTEIN AND VALUE
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Wittgenstein is considered to have been one of the most influential philosophers of the last century. Nevertheless, his significance is distinctive mostly in the philosophy of language. His work is often used in other areas of philosophy or the humanities as well, but often as a kind of specific original extension of the core notions of his work on meaningsuch as forms of life, language games, private language, rule-following etc. However, there are strong suggestions that Wittgenstein himself would prefer to be remembered not as an expert on the theory of meaning, whose work can be applied to a wide range of areas, but as a full-blooded philosopher in the traditional or even classical sense. One can even see him as the last man standing in contemporary expert culture.
In order to understand Wittgenstein in this vein, we must turn to the question of his contribution to the subject of value. His work on language has obvious connections with logic, metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of the mind. His considerations on the therapeutic function of philosophy are influential in metaphilosophy and other areas. It is also widely known that Wittgenstein himself was a rather peculiar person with strong views on various questions of value (ethical, political, religious or artistic). Nevertheless, his theoretical contribution to the subject is rather opaque, as it is often completely overlooked or considered marginal and outdated, perhaps esoteric at best. Still, there is a group of philosophers who find his texts illuminating or worthy of discussion in this area. They are not only ardent followers; some of them are quite well-known. Nonetheless, the link between Wittgenstein's conception of value and his philosophy of language (and possibly mind) on the one hand, and contemporary discussions on ethics and so forth, on the other, is often lacking-especially in our region. Bearing this in mind, one cannot but recommend the new volume by Continuum Press to his colleagues.
Throughout the book, the author, Eric Litwack, builds on Wittgenstein's negative attitude towards scientism. He starts with an exposition on the Tractarian theory of meaning and the associated idea that (strictly speaking) value statements have no meaning, although they may play an important role in our lives. This is the point where Litwack (in accordance with the traditional overall interpretation of the two Wittgensteins) situates the difference between the early and the late Wittgenstein. The late Wittgenstein allegedly shifted the focus still further away from scientism, refusing to leave any privileged status for the statements of natural sciences. Scientific statements are the only set amongst the many types of human linguistic practices that have their own criteria of meaningfulness. To clarify the point Litwack gives an account of the notions of language games and private language; hence the reader can appreciate the context of the later Wittgenstein's philosophy with its stress on public criteria and shared life forms (with embedded values). Now has come the time to distinguish Wittgenstein from behaviourists. Whereas the later identify the mental with behaviour, Wittgenstein understands the mental as being expressed through behaviour (with particular attention to facial expressions); nevertheless, without reifying soul. This tiny distinction has far-reaching consequences, since it provides an opportunity for cognitivist ethics. Recognizing somebody as a fellow creature (namely as something besouled) is then fundamental to our moral judgments without the necessity of choosing between materialism and dualism. And when this recognition is perceptual (we see somebody as a besouled being), the knowledge in question is not inferential, it is closely tied to practice and it is not easily subjected to doubt.
Litwack, standing on the shoulders of Wittgensteinian moral philosophers from Anscombe to McDowell or Diamond extends this consideration to the thesis that a feeling of sharing a cluster of characteristics can be more fundamental to our decisions and evaluations than any theoretical justification. At the same time, he insists on a linguistic form of moral realism-our moral judgments are factual and this factuality is based on meaning (understood as practice). This point is crucial in deciding moral dilemmas and arguments, since what one needs to convince the opponent is to bring a certain shift in perspective or shed new light on the matter. Our moral utterances are mere refinements of natural reactions, but this refinement involves commitment to truth. When we surmise a subject, what we do is not just an expression of a feeling or prescription-we mean to state something and our utterance is meant to have a truth value. Such an interpretation invites further investigation into the notion of truth in ordinary discourse, since it obviously circumvents the reduction of factuality to strictly empirical evidence. Moral language and morality then have their own internal criteria of justification and success.
This inevitably leads to discussion on relativism. Wittgenstein (according to his interpreters) easily avoids the trap of Platonic realism. Litwack refers to Peter Winch, Sabina Lovinbond and Cyril Barrett to argue that Wittgenstein escapes the dangers of relativism, as well. Wittgensteinian philosophy then leaves some room for mutual understanding across time and space, across different languages and cultures. It only requires the participation of other forms of life for individual social practices (including beliefs and evaluations) to be placed in the appropriate context. This context itself need not be static as it can evolve and possibly even fuse with another context of a belief system or culture. And naturally there is a chapter devoted to questions of bedrock and certainty.
In sum, what one gets is a meaningful series of expositions of particular papers by meaningful participants in the debate on Wittgensteinian ethics and aesthetics over the last few decades. The texts follow on one from another, always bundled in chapters around particular topics. Each exposition stresses a certain point or aspect of the debate. And so we go from the introductory exposition of the traditional version of Tractarian picture theory with its ineffability consequence, through language games, forms of life, concept of soul, aspect seeing, rule-following, religion, scientism, theory of art, moral realism, certainty to relativism. The author is well-versed in the discussion, his choice of topics and texts is knowledgeable and all the particular interpretations are dealt with charitably. The book may prove very useful as guidance for a seminar on the subject or as an introduction to an issue. The book is undemanding; no previous knowledge is presupposed and the style does not present any obstacles. References to Wittgenstein's own texts are mostly hidden in notes at the end of particular chapters. Reader may be slightly frustrated by the feeling that it all flows too easily. There are no textual problems, the clash of scholars is dimmed, and alternative perspectives passed over, and last but not least, the author is rather humble in his own insights into subject.
